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COPYRIGHT VERSUS PATENTS: THE OPEN SOURCE
SOFTWARE LEGAL BATTLE
FRANÇOIS LÉVÊQUE AND YANN MÉNIÈRE
Abstract. Open Source Software is often viewed as an anti-intellectual prop-
erty regime. In contrast, we argue how intellectual property law is at the heart
of open source model since licenses that organize the innovation and busi-
ness relationships between developers, distributors and end-users are based on
copyright law. The proliferation of software patents can, however be seen as
a threat for the development and deployment of open source software. We
present the nature of the threat and review a series of initiatives undertaken
by the open source community to address them eﬀectively. These initiatives,
such as the redesign of licenses and the creation of patent commons, are a
testiment to a genuinely creative use of intellectual property law by the open
source community, not its undermining.
1. Introduction
Competition between proprietary and open source software (e.g., Windows ver-
sus Linux operating systems for PCs) is often pictured as reflecting an opposition
between pro and anti intellectual property law supporters. In fact, the recent EC
Commission’s attempt to legalize software patents in the EU has been defended
by Microsoft and other proprietary software champions while obstructed by the
Free Software Foundation and similar Open Source organizations. Such a view
is misleading. Open Source Software (hereafter, OSS) relies upon a key body of
intellectual property law, namely copyright. Absent copyright law, open source
would be unable to license software to developers, distributors and end-users. The
great divide between proprietary and open source models lies between patents and
copyright. This paper explains why copyright is at the heart of OSS, how software
patents may thwart its development and deployment, and why the risk of patent
hold-up is decreasing. Section 2 presents the reasons why it is easy to be misled
in viewing OSS as an anti-intellectual property model. Section 3 provides a primer
on OSS licensing. Section 4 analyses open source licenses from an economic stand-
point. Section 5 discusses the conflicting relationships between OSS and patents.
Section 6 describes individual and collective initiatives undertaken by open source
interested parties to limit patent obstacles. Section 7 concludes.
2. Good reasons to be misled
There are good reasons for a neutral observer familiar with economics to believe
that open source is an anti-IP system. Indeed, economists commonly consider open
source software as a form of a public good, which is distributed for free to users
and is therefore under-produced by programmers.
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Firstly, economic literature is dominated with a single issue:1 how can developers
work for free? Although code cannot be sold by imposing royalties on copies and
derived works, millions of lines of open source program have been written since the
Free Software Foundation was created in 1985. To explain this puzzle of production
without money incentives, economists have analysed individual rewards such as the
benefit for a user of improving the software (Von Hippel, 2002), peer recognition,
and reputation on the job market for programmers. Such a focus on the absence
of financial incentives led to overlooking the role of IP in open source because of
the simple but wrong equation ‘IP equals Incentives’ and, by consequence, the
lack of incentives indicates the absence of IP.2 In fact, the economic analysis of
IPRs tends to overemphasize the incentives function of copyright and patent laws.
Since Kenneth Arrow (1962), the story goes as follows: creations and inventions are
information goods and, by corollary, are non excludable; consequently, creators and
innovators cannot recoup the money they invest, and society is confronted with an
underproduction of artistic and technical works; IP law makes these goods legally
excludable and the free-riding problem that ex ante blocks investment for producing
information is solved. Other roles of IP law, especially the allocative function in
facilitating the diﬀusion of works through exchange have been neglected. This
function is, however, critical.3 This can be deduced from Coase’s (1960) insights
according to which granting property rights eases contracting and thus improves
allocative eﬃciency.4 As we will see in the remaining of the paper, the use of IP in
open source is rooted in this exchange function.
Secondly, commons look like public domain. According to a more elaborate
story, the entitlement of IP rights law ensures a trade-oﬀ between incentives and
use. Information goods are both non excludable and non rival. The latter means
that consumption does not reduce the quantity available. Therefore, if access to
information is restricted to those who pay for it, consumption is ineﬃciently ra-
tioned: certain consumers are excluded (i.e., those who cannot pay the fee) despite
the fact that they could otherwise enjoy a private benefit without generating any
social cost. In limiting the protection period of patents and copyrights, IP law
opens the access to all and reduces welfare losses resulting from charging for non
rival goods. In fact, when a patent or a copyright expires, it enters into the public
domain and fees can no longer be required for the works that are no longer owned.
In other words, protection mitigates the incentives problem while the end of pro-
tection mitigates the rationing problem. A common feature between OSS commons
and public domain is that both oﬀer access for free. As was said before, no fees
limit the number of copies or the possibilities to modify OSS. However, unlike the
1A seminal economic paper on OSS albeit bearing the general title ‘The Simple Economics of
Open Source’ focuses on the incentives puzzle. It has been written by two smart and influential
economists, J. Tirole and J. Lerner (2002). It has triggered a stream of works on the same issue.
2Even Lerner and Tirole (2002) seem not to have avoided the mouse-trap in their first article.
Comparing proprietary and open source software schemes they write that owners of proprietary
codes cannot “easily allow users to modify their code and customize it without jeopardizing
intellectual property rights” (p. 25). It is true that modifications and customisations of code are
restricted in licenses of proprietary software. However, this does not mean that IP holders put
their IPRs at risk when they alleviate these restrictions. Their copyright or patents will still be
valid.
3For a general presentation of the economic functions see Lévêque and Ménière (2004).
4For a use of the other famous paper on the nature of the firm by Coase (1937) to highlight
the organisation of the free software production, see Benkler (2002).
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public domain, OSS is owned through copyrights (mostly) or patents (more rarely).
OSS commons that regroup pieces of code are not res nullius. Their access is free of
charge but not unrestricted. Users of OSS under the copyleft license, for instance,
must give back their improvements into the commons, which perhaps they would
not have done spontaneously. To put it another way, open source uses copyright as
a lever to rebalance the trade-oﬀ between incentives and use in favour of the latter.
It is truly an opposite direction to the historical patterns of increasing IP protection
duration, especially in copyright law,5 but it does not mean the abolishing of IP.
Thirdly, terminology is often confusing. As any scientific and technical com-
munity, open source community has forged its own language. OSS was initially
baptised ‘free software’, a name that is easy to associate with the idea of public
domain and gratuitousness. ‘Copyleft’ is another key word used in OSS jargon. It
designates the bargain whenever the right to copy and modify the code without
payment to the licensor is exchanged with the obligation for the licensee to enrich
the software commons with her own contributions. The term wrongly suggests
that open source regime rejects and opposes copyright when it actually rejects and
opposes the usual use of copyright for an exclusion purpose.
Fourthly, open source organisations and their leaders are prompt to denounce
patent system failures. They have played an active role in the EU to block the
legalization of software patentability. Hence the misleading syllogism: ‘OSS is
against patents’ ‘patent equals IP’ thus ‘OSS is against IP’. Note that economists
are not fully innocent. In economic literature, IP is often used as a synonymous to
patent. Intellectual property is a catchy term that encompasses all rights ensuring
a trade-oﬀ between incentives and use as mentioned above, from those delivered for
plant varieties protection to those devoted to database protection.
In a nutshell, in the eyes of economists OSS may look at first glance like an
anti-IP system, or at best as copyright unrelated.
3. A primer on open source licenses
About sixty diﬀerent types of OSS licenses are currently on the shelves. It is out
of the scope of this paper to review them.6 We will only briefly explain what their
common features are and describe the most popular ones. In fact, as indicated in
Table 1, one license, the so-called General Public License, is widely used and the
top 5 licenses represent 86 % of all OSS projects as well as of all developers involved
in these projects.
3.1. Open source licenses: definitions. Open source licenses set the relation-
ship between the copyright holder and everyone who wants to take advantage of
the software. They look very unfamiliar relatively to traditional copyright software
licenses as well as to IP licenses in general. Commonly, a license restricts the use of
the licensee to some field of use, to some geographic areas and to specific products.
Moreover, it contains marketing arrangements that specify terms and conditions
for licensees to pay royalties to the licensor. For instance, the Microsoft Oﬃce suite
license indicates that you are not allowed to distribute the software anywhere for
5Originally set at 14 years, copyright in the United States has been gradually extended to the
current 70 years after the author’s death.
6For a comprehensive legal analysis of OSS licenses, see Rosen’s (2004) reference book; for a
brief overview see Kennedy (2001); for the full text of each license see the Open Source Initiative
website http://www.opensource.org/licenses/.
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any purpose and gives details on the number of copies you are restricted to. An
extra payment is required for additional copies. By contrast, OSS licensees grant
freedom of use of the licensed software for any purpose and the freedom to make
copies of, and to distribute the licensed software without payment of royalties to
the licensor. As far as software modifications are concerned, OSS licensees are not
restricted. They can create a derivative work, for instance in debugging the soft-
ware or in improving its customisation, and distribute it. Moreover, the licensee
can redistribute her derived work and does not need to pay a royalty to the licen-
sor, not even to report her business. In a nutshell, people are receiving a license
that gives them more rights than they have become accustomed to expect under
commercial software licenses.
Table 1: The most popular OSI licenses
Projects Developers**
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Apache 2,196 2.6 5,234 2.8
BSD 5,968 7.0 15,335 8.2
CDDL 114 0.1 171 0.1
CPL 763 0.9 1890 1.0
Eclipse 241 0.3 506 0.3
GPL 54,842 64.5 112,341 59.9
LGPL 9,429 11.1 23,673 12.6
MIT 1,616 1.9 3,876 2.1
MPL 1,360 1.6 3,937 2.1
Other 8,542 10.0 20,553 11.0
TOTAL 85,071* 100.0 187,516 100.0
* This figure is a little higher than the number of projects, for we count one project as
two in the cases in which the project is registered under two diﬀerent licenses
** Because nearly two thirds of registered projects in SourceForge involve only one
developer, we also estimated the importance of licenses according to the number of devel-
opers they gather.
The common features of OSS licenses are enacted in a charter issued in 1998
by the Open Source Initiative. This non-profit organization acts as a certification
body. It approves models of OSS licenses, whether they are improved versions of
old licenses or genuine new licenses. The charter contains 10 cumulative rules,7
dealing inter alia with non-discrimination against people and fields of use, author’s
integrity, source code delivery, free redistribution and authorization for software
modifications. The fulfilment of all the rules is necessary for a license to be certified
by OSI and listed on its website. To make a long story short, the essence of the 10
rules can be summed up in five principles, as follows.
The 5 principles of OSS licenses (source: Rosen, 2004)
(1) Licensees are free to access and use the source code of OSS. According to
this principle, the licensor of OSS has to make the source code available to
licensees at zero price. Moreover, the latter can modify it, in particular to
customize the software to his specific needs.
7See http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php to get the list of, and explanations on
the 10 criteria.
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(2) Licensees are free to use OSS for any purpose whatsoever. Restrictions on
use, such as ‘for research or non non-commercial purposes only’ or ‘exclud-
ing genetic research’ are not allowed.
(3) Licensees are free to make copies of OSS and to distribute them without
payment of royalties to a licensor. This principle states that a licensee need
not pay the licensor for additional copies he makes himself, even if those
copies are distributed to others.
(4) Licenses are free to create derivative works of OSS and to distribute them
without payment of royalties to a licensor. Under this principle, a licensor
cannot charge a royalty for the privilege to create and distribute derivative
works, or require a licensee to pay a royalty for copies of a derivative works
that are distributed, or impose any restrictions on the type or character of
those derivative works.
(5) Licensees are free to combine OSS and other software. OSS licenses may not
impose conditions or restrictions on other software with which the licensed
software is merely combined or distributed. This prevents restrictions re-
garding what other software can be placed on computer storage media or
in computer memory.
It is worthwhile making a few general comments on the rules of the OSI charter
to cast light on the flexibility that OSS licenses oﬀer.
Firstly, making the source code available is an obligation for the licensor, not for
the licensee. As is well known, OSS is synonymous with making the source code
available to developers and users. This enables them to correct defects and bugs
and customize programs or add features as they deem appropriate. However, they
are not required, as licensees, to make available their own source code, that is, the
code containing the modifications they introduced into the initial licensed program.
Some licenses (e.g., the GPL, see below) impose this requirement, but this is not a
necessary condition for a license to be certified by OSI.
Secondly, OSS is completely free for users. As pointed out by Rosen (2004)
“OSS can be freely used by anyone, anywhere and for any purpose whatsoever”.
Whatever the OSS licenses, users can make copies for free and can modify the
program according to their needs without any restrictions. The only exception to
this grand freedom given to users is that licensees are generally restrained from
complaining about software failures8 and bringing a patent infringement lawsuit
(see Section 5).
Thirdly, zero royalty is a key feature of OSS licenses. The source code is available
for free. Only payments to cover reproduction costs,9 if any, are allowed; copies of
the licensed program are unlimited and free of charge; copies of derived works are
themselves also exempted from royalties to be paid to the owner of the initial work
(i.e., the licensor). In proscribing royalties OSS, licenses slightly contrasts with
the licensing of IPRs in economic textbooks wherein patent and copyright licenses
are structured to maximize licensor’s profit. Discrimination, a canonical way to
maximize monopolist’s surplus, is also proscribed in OSS licenses. Nevertheless, the
8Most OSI licenses disclaim liability for damages. No warranties are oﬀered to users about the
performance of the licensed program.
9Rule 2 of the OSI charter on source code states that “Where some form of a product is not
distributed with source code, there must be a well-publicized means of obtaining the source code
for no more than a reasonable reproduction cost.”
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reader must not conclude that OSS licensors and licensees cannot make money in
selling code. OSS licenses are not exclusive. Copyright owners can also license their
code with another license, providing for instance, a warranty to customers. Such a
multiple licensing is exemplified at the end of this section. Moreover, licensees may
sometimes also license their derivative works under non-OSS licenses and therefore
can ask royalties to their licensees.
OSS licenses diﬀer in several respects. The key one is whether the license ex-
plicitly restricts the choice of licensees in licensing their derivative works. The
GPL is the most influential license containing such a restraint. If a licensee im-
proves the code of a GPL-licensed piece of software, he should also use the GPL
license to distribute her new piece of software. As a consequence, he will have to
make the improved code available and to permit copies and redistribution at zero
royalty. The GPL license was first published in 1989. It was written by Richard
Stallman, the founding father of the Free Software Foundation, and Eben Moglen,
from the Columbia School of Law. Their basic idea in imposing such a restriction,
the so-called “copyleft”, was to ensure software access to developers and to prevent
software from being captured by proprietary software interests. Access would be
ensured since licensees cannot selfishly remove their improvements from the col-
lective resource available to developers. Capture would be avoided, since royalties
cannot be claimed. A major factor in the spread of popularity of the GPL in the
developers and users communities is that is has been adopted by Linus Tordvals for
the development of Linux. The Linux operating system and programs associated
with Linux are mostly licensed under GPL licenses.
During the eighties, Bill Joy from the University of California at Berkeley forged
another type of license that has become very influential and widespread too, the
Berkeley Software Distribution (hereafter, BSD) license. Unlike the GPL, the BSD
license does not require that the derivative works also be subject to the same terms
as the initial GPL license. BSD licensees can improve the software and distribute
their derived works without any obligation regarding source code disclosure and
royalty payments. They can integrate the software provided by the licensor in any
proprietary software of their own and may adopt proprietary licenses. BSD licenses
can now be found in commercial software such as Windows NT and the Apple’s
operating system, OS X.
GPL and BSD licenses have served as models for many other OSS licenses. In
fact, they gave birth to two families of licenses, the so-called academic licenses for
BSD-type licenses and the so-called copyleft (or reciprocal) licenses for GPL-type
licenses. Generally speaking, they are more precise and legally sound, for they
benefit from discussions on first OSS licenses and on their loopholes and failures.
The MIT license and the Common Public License (CPL, hereafter), which have
been written by professional lawyers, are good examples of more modern academic
and reciprocal licenses, respectively. Indeed, both make explicit the rights that
are granted to licensees in terms of copyright law. CPL, for instance, states in
Section 2(a) that the licensor grants licensees “a non exclusive, worldwide, royalty
free copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works of, publicly display,
publicly perform, distribute and sublicense” the considered software. More recent
licenses are also clearer with respect to the use of the name of the licensor and its
software. The Apache license, for instance, specifically excludes the granting of the
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trademark to licensees. It requires an acknowledgment in end-user documentation
and it proscribes the use of the name ‘Apache’ to promote derived works.
Copyleft licenses are not uniform regarding the scope of the reciprocity obliga-
tion. The GPL obligation is the broadest. It states in section 2(b) that “you must
cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains
or is derived from the program or any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at
no charge to all third parties under the terms of this license”. This statement has
raised concern about the possibility to combine GPL-licensed software with propri-
etary software in collective works and larger works that include works derived from
GPL-licensed initial work. As a response, the Free Software Foundation developed
the Lesser General Public License (LGPL, hereafter) that explicitly allows such a
combination to be made through the use of programming libraries. Such a use does
not infect the proprietary software in requiring it to be subject to the provision
of GPL. The Mozilla Public License (MPL, hereafter) is also much less restrictive
than GPL. Its reciprocity obligation concerns only the files containing the deriva-
tive works and not the derivative works more broadly. MPL-licensed software can
be used as building blocks to create larger works, for the latter may be open or
proprietary. As pointed out by Rosen (2004), MPL acts like an academic license
for larger works but the individual building blocks are licensed with reciprocity
obligations.
3.2. Open source licenses and copyright law. To conclude this general presen-
tation, we would like to emphasize on the encrustation of OSS licenses in copyright
law. Generally speaking, an OSS license is a copyright license; the licensor owns the
copyright of the software; he grants a generous license but this must not be viewed
as she surrenders her copyright. As already said, OSS must not be confused with
public domain. Take the GPL, for instance. It is a bare copyright license and relies
entirely upon copyright law for its enforcement. Section 5 states that “nothing else
[than the license] grants you the permission to modify or distribute the program or
its derivative works. These actions are prohibited by [Copyright] law”. The MIT
license is another example. As already mentioned above, the licensor explicitly
grants to the licensee all his exclusive copyright rights to copy, modify, distribute,
publicly perform and publicly display as listed in the US copyright law. Copyright
ownership being a necessary condition to license OSS, only the copyright holder
can decide to adopt and issue other licenses.
Because initial licenses contain loopholes, new versions including clearer defin-
itions and additional provisions are required. For instance, a new version of the
Apache license was released in 2004, in order inter alia to include a patent defense
clause (see section 5) and to clarify the submission of contributions. As another
example, a revision of GPL has been intensively debated for the past two years.
The final text of the new GPL template is likely to be released at the end of 2006.
Some OSS license migration can also take place. The open source ERP software
OFBiz, for instance, shifted from MIT to Apache 2.0 to provide a better legal se-
curity to end-users. Of course, only copyright holders can decide OSS relicensing.
Such changes are thus diﬃcult when open source projects are in the hands of many
copyright holders since each contributor has a say. To avoid such a burden, an
alternative consists in centralizing the rights at the project level through assign-
ments or delegation. The Free Software Foundation, for instance, asks for copyright
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assignments from authors of code incorporated in FSF projects. The Apache Foun-
dation Software requires its contributors to submit a signed contributors’ license
agreement that provides the foundation with flexibility for relicensing. Since only
copyright holders can defend themselves against copyright infringement, note that
such centralization enables also a better enforcement of OSS licenses.
Only copyright holders too can propose diﬀerent licenses for the same software,
an OSS license and a proprietary license. MySQL, for instance, provides its data-
base software both under the GPL for OSS developers and distributors and a com-
mercial license for OEMs. Ghostscript, a Postscript interpreter, proposes a com-
mercial license for the most recent version of the software and a GPL for older
versions. These multiple licensing strategies oﬀer growing business opportunities
for OSS deployment.10
4. Basic economic analysis of OSS licenses
4.1. Incentives and use. The requirements to make the source code available and
not to ask for royalties maximize the use and diﬀusion of software innovation and
minimize the cost of R&D duplication. Let us explain this statement. As already
mentioned, IPRs operate a trade-oﬀ between incentives and use. Since OSS licenses
of initial works cannot impose royalties on copying and modifying the software, the
cost of access for users and developers equals the marginal cost of reproducing and
communicating the code and the related documents. This cost is close to zero, for
most of this information can be downloaded from the Internet. In other terms,
the OSI licenses follow the economic prescription that information as a non-rival
good must be priced at its marginal cost of communication. In principle, the
reverse of the medal is a loss in incentives — and thus in innovation —, for licensors
cannot recoup the costs of their eﬀorts through royalties. In fact, they enjoy other
rewards. There is a long list of speculative or empirically observed motives in
literature that explain the benefits developers get outside of royalties. It suﬃces
here to say that in so far as developers choose an OSS license, they expect to find
one way or another to compensate their cost. The reason is that an OSI certified
license is not their single option. When royalties are necessary for some developers
to recoup costs or for some software to be developed, proprietary licenses can be
used as an alternative. We may therefore infer that the non-rivalry prescription
is not achieved at the detriment of incentives. Whether OSS licenses decrease
investment in developing software because of the monetary incentive loss they entail
is only an issue for the GPL and other reciprocal licenses. For these licenses, the
licensee has no other choice than distributing his derived work without royalties
for copies and subsequent modifications. If he is not sensitive to non-monetary
rewards of OSS, his single alternative option is not to invest in modifying the
GPL-licensed software. One cannot therefore exclude that some welfare enhancing
innovations will not be made. GPL adversaries often claim that copyleft licenses
hinder software innovation, especially those suited to end-users needs because they
discourage participation from commercial software companies.
The free access to source code maximises the diﬀusion of the knowledge contained
in the protected software. It plays the same role as patent disclosure in enabling
R&D spillovers. It reduces duplication costs, an important saving for society be-
cause reinventing the wheel is a waste of resources. Interestingly, the decrease
10For a presentation of business model-OSS license nexus see Valimaki and Oksanen (2002).
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in duplication cost is amplified by the absence of royalties in licenses. Generally
speaking, licenses reduce duplication cost since the choice for a licensee is either to
license or to work around the protected innovation. Of course, he opts for a license
for which the cost of the license is lower than the R&D costs of working around.
In so far as OSS licenses are royalty free, the cost of the license is zero and thus
R&D is never duplicated. Again, copyleft licenses are a special case. The choice
for a GPL license is costly for the licensee because he may lose the opportunity
to make money in closing the code and claiming royalties for copies. He will have
to choose to duplicate the GPL-licensed code in rewriting it or to accept the GPL
license with its reciprocal obligations.
In principle, the reverse of the medal is a loss in incentives - and thus in innovation
- for licensors cannot recoup the costs of their eﬀorts through royalties. In fact,
they enjoy other rewards. There is a long list of speculative or empirically observed
motives in literature that explain the benefits developers get outside royalties. It
suﬃces here to say that in so far as developers choose an OSS license, they expect to
find a way or another to compensate their cost. The reason is that an OSI certified
license is not their single option. When royalties are necessary for some developers
to recoup costs or for some software to be developed, proprietary licenses can be
used as an alternative. We may therefore infer that the non-rivalry prescription
is not achieved at the detriment of incentives. Whether OSS licenses decrease
investment in developing software because of the monetary incentive loss they entail
is only an issue for the GPL and other reciprocal licenses. For these licenses, the
licensee has no other choice than distributing his derived work without royalties
for copies and subsequent modifications. If he is not sensitive to non-monetary
rewards of OSS, his single alternative option is not to invest in modifying the
GPL-licensed software. One cannot therefore exclude that some welfare enhancing
innovations will not be made. GPL adversaries often claim that copyleft licenses
hinder software innovation, especially those suited to end-users needs because they
discourage participation from commercial software companies.
4.2. Open source commons. Another key diﬀerence lies in the building and the
size of the commons.11 GPL creates a vast commons for it obliges developers to give
back their modified works to the commons. The size of the commons grows with the
evolution of the projects. On the contrary, under an academic license, developers
cannot be refrained from making their modifications proprietary. In free-ridding,
they will benefit from a collective eﬀort without contributing to it. It seems (Rosen,
2004), however, that despite the absence of reciprocal obligation, many contributors
to software projects under BSD or similar licenses pour their modified code into
the commons. Putting it another way, they see more value to themselves in giving
software away than in keeping it private. Everything being equal, the commons
of GPL source code would be larger than the commons of code under academic
licenses. Of course, other factors enter into account. Fershtman and Gandal (2005)
11From an economic point of view, this term is misleading for commons are non excludable
and rival goods. It is merely because they are rival that commons may tragically become depleted
like meadows by overgrazing when property rights are not entitled. By contrast, source code
is excludable (e.g., through secret, technical features and IP law) and non-rival. OSS licenses
make the code non excludable but the code remains non rival. Anyway, we will also use the term
commons here for it is widely used in OS literature to emphasise that access and use of OSS are
free.
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have demonstrated, for instance, that the output per contributor (i.e., the number
of lines of code) is lower for projects under copyleft licenses than for projects under
academic licenses. As an explanation, they suggest that developers contribute up to
the threshold level necessary to have their name listed on copyleft-licensed software
whereas they have financial incentives to go beyond with academic licenses. Larger
individual contributions for academic licenses may therefore compensate the smaller
size of academic commons resulting from the absence of reciprocal obligation.
The size of the commons also depends on the attractiveness of the diﬀerent
licenses for project leaders and contributors. The majority of project leaders seem
to prefer copyleft licenses, for these represent a large majority of licenses they choose
(cf. table 1). However, as pointed out by Lerner and Tirole (2005a and 2005b), in
some cases leaders may prefer an academic license but opt for a copyleft license to
get the participation of more developers in their projects if the latter would prefer
this type of license. In their analysis of 38.000 projects posted on SourceForge, they
found that:
• projects with academic licenses are larger;
• the choice of licenses diﬀers depending on whether projects are oriented to-
wards end-users (e.g., game software) or applications for software develop-
ers (reciprocal licenses are more common in the first case whereas academic
licenses are more frequent in the second);
• copyleft licenses are less common for more mature projects.
Finally, project leaders may adopt this or that license just because others have
done so. Learning costs to know the subtle diﬀerences between all OSS licenses
are high. Old licenses, even if they contain loopholes and ambiguities, enjoy the
advantage of historical standards. This may explain why, for instance, the MIT
license, albeit more precise and legally sound, has not supplanted the BSD license
(cf. Figure 1).
Finally, it is important to notice that there is not a single OSS commons. The
reason is that there are several licenses some of which are incompatible. The current
number of licenses listed on the OSI site is 59. Getting a clear picture of their
similarities and diﬀerences needs time and eﬀort.12 Of course, the multiplication of
OSS licenses13 has improved the choice for project leaders and software companies
to find the license that best suits their needs. It seems, however, that this advantage
does not oﬀset the major drawback of license multiplication: the partitioning of OS
commons. The goal of open source has been to make it easier to reuse code written
by someone else. Incompatible licenses limit reuse and may result in a tragedy of the
anticommons. It is not possible for instance to add a GPL-licensed contribution to
an Apache-licensed derivative work. Instead of having a single commons wherein a
developer collects diﬀerent pieces of software to derive a new work, he must restrict
his choice of software to, say, Commons A, B and D and cannot graze in commons C.
Generally speaking, academic licenses are more compatible than copyleft licenses.
A GPL-licensed code can be combined with BSD-licensed code and the derived work
distributed under GPL. The reverse is impossible: a BSD-licensed project can use
12Lawrence Rosen’s (2004) complete and thorough book on open source licensing contains 314
pages. The full text of all approved licenses available on the OSI website amounts to more than
a thousand pages.
13In October 1999, the OSI website listed about a dozen licenses. The number increased to 35
in Fall 2002 (Peters, 2006).
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Figure 1. The evolution of license choice (Each year new OSS
projects are listed on SourceForge and project leaders indicate the
license they choose. The figure shows that the historical licenses,
namely, GPL and BSD remain by far the most popular.
and redistribute GPL-licensed derivative work only if the project is relicensed into
GPL. Generally speaking, the game is not worth the candle since, as was said
before, relicensing requires the permission of all copyright owners. An alternative
may consist in accepting the legal risk. Incompatibility of, say, MPL or Apache with
GPL or LGPL is not iron-cast. In spite of claims by the Free Software Foundation
to the contrary, whether a developer could be successfully sued on grounds related
to these perceived license incompatibilities is unclear.
The issue of license multiplication has been tackled by OSI, and they created a
license proliferation committee at the end of 2005. OSI seeks to reduce the increase
in the number of licenses and to enlarge the use of the most popular ones. The first
draft report of the committee was issued in July 2006. It has selected 9 licenses,
including inter alia BSD, MIT, GPL, LGPL, Apache, and MPL as popular and
widely used or with strong communities. It encourages licensors to select their
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license from this group. OSI also tries to discourage registration of new licenses.
In recent guidelines, it has recommended that licenses must not be duplicative. In
fact, signalling has been one reason for firms to register their own OSS license.
These vanity licenses are one cause of license inflation. Lucent, IBM, Sun, Nokia,
RealNetworks, Apple, and Ricoh, for example, all possess their own OSI license.
They are either redundant with more popular licenses or cannot be reused for
they are specific to products or projects. Some authors of licenses such as Intel
and Jabber have put down their ego in withdrawing their OSI certified license.
Mozilla foundation’s relicensing is another initiative to cope with the tragedy of
the anticommons that license proliferation entails. The Mozilla source code is now
open under a triple license GPL, LGPL and MPL. This means that developers can
combine Mozilla code with LGPL and GPL code and redistribute their derived
work in using one of the three licenses.
5. Patent obstacles for OSS development and deployment
As shown in the previous section, OSS development and deployment rely upon
copyright. By contrast, most OSS supporters are fierce opponents to software
patents. Software patents are generally viewed as raising serious obstacles for the
growing use and development of OSS. We evaluate this assertion in this part. We
recall first the problems raised by patents in the proprietary software industry, and
discuss as a second step whether they also concern open source software communi-
ties.
5.1. Software patent, hold up and defensive patenting. The software tech-
nology is such that one software program may embody a large number of patented
elements. Such patents are broader than copyright. Therefore they encompass a
wider range of software applications and they are more diﬃcult to circumvent by
rewriting the code. Moreover, it may be diﬃcult to identify all those patents in
advance, especially because the software industry has primarily developed in the
realm of copyright, so that information on prior art is still diﬃcult to collect. In
this context, the risk of patent “hold up” is important.
The problem of hold up is frequent in ICT industries where products usually
encompass a large number of patents14 some of which may be diﬃcult to identify
at early stages of innovation15 (FTC, 2003). It is more acute when the patented
element represents only a small fraction of the profits generated by the technology
for the patent owner can then leverage the threat of an injunction to impose a fee
that largely exceed the intrinsic value of the patented element (Lemley and Shapiro,
2006).
Empirical evidence shows that large capital intensive companies are the main
cause and the main victims of the threat of patent hold up (Hall and Ziedonis,
2001). Their large patent portfolios confer them more opportunities to initiate
profitable patent litigation. Yet because of their wealth, they are also the most
14More than “90,000 patents generally related to microprocessors are held by more than 10,000
parties”, while “approximately 420,000 semiconductor and system patents [are] held by more than
40,000 parties.” (FTC, 2003).
15Even when infringed patents are identified early enough, it is often diﬃcult to assess whether
these patents are really valid, for many software patents are in fact fragile in this respect (Burk
& Lemley, 2005). Such uncertainty on the legal validity of patents makes it more diﬃcult for
developers to strike licensing deals in order to clear the way for innovation.
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valuable targets for opportunistic patent litigation. They reply to such threats by
filing more and more patents which they can use as counter threats against each
other, thereby thickening the patent thicket (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; FTC, 2003).16
The balance of patent threats eventually enables them to negotiate cross-licensing
agreements whereby they grant each other freedom to operate on their respective
patent portfolios.17 Large firms are however still threatened by small firms — so
called “patent trolls” — that specialize in patent litigation without any productive
activity. Indeed the counter-threat of a reciprocal patent litigation does not operate
on that kind of opportunistic predators.
By contrast, empirical evidence shows that small software firms tend to use
patents merely as a protection mechanism to preserve incentives to innovate, or
as a signalling mechanism to attract venture capital (Hall and MacGarvy, 2006).
Although they do not represent profitable litigation targets for purely opportunistic
patent holders such as trolls, they remain exposed to litigation initiated by competi-
tors. In this case small firms can neither leverage a large patent portfolio to counter
the threat of litigation, nor aﬀord the high cost of a patent litigation.18 Therefore
they tend to specialize in niche markets to minimize the risk of patent litigation,
as it has been observed in the semi-conductor industry (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).
5.2. The patent threat on open source software. The threat of patent hold up
also concerns open source software. Patent thickets tend to surround open source
software, all the more so as large software and hardware firms get increasingly in-
volved in opens source projects and thus tend to extend their patent portfolios in
that direction. A study by Open Source Risk Management (2004) found for in-
stance that 283 patents could potentially be used to support claims of infringement
against the Linux kernel.19 In fact, the key question is whether the probability of
infringement is higher for OSS than for proprietary software. It is commonly said
16Such defensive patenting strategies are typical of the semi-conductor and computer hardware
industries (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; FTC, 2003). They also exist in the software industry, in part
because of the influence of hardware firms in this sector. In the late 1990’s, hardware firms
accounted for more than 50% of U.S. software patents, and this share was increasing (Graham &
Mowery, 2003).
17In the FTC report on Patent and Innovation (2003), these strategies are labelled “MAD”.
The acronym stands for Mutual Assured Destruction — the likely outcome of a full litigation
between two large firms asserting their patent portfolios against each other.
18Note that the risk of patent dispute depends on your defences as perceived by your adver-
saries. In this respect, the asymmetry between small- and large-sized enterprises is high. Resolving
patent disputes in the courts costs several millions of US dollars. This amount is too high to be
aﬀorded by individual developers and small firms. The model-railroad control software dispute
gives a good illustration. Bob Jacobsen developed a model-railroad control software and gives
his work away with full source code. He is faced with an invoice for over US $ 200.000 from the
company KAM. This company filed a patent making a broad claim covering the transmission of
model-railroad command between multiple devices in 2002. According to B. Perens (2006), the
patent is likely to be invalid for lack of novelty for the technology goes back to the MIT model
railroad club in the 1960s. However, Bob Jacobsen could easily bankrupt in defending himself.
19These patents have not been reviewed by the courts; it is unknown whether they are valid
and/or they are infringed. As pointed out by Lemley and Shapiro (2005) a patent is only a
probabilistic property right. Litigation and court ruling are necessary to assert if the patent holds.
In average, when a patent is challenged in the US court system, the court finds it invalid about
40% percent of the time. For this figure concerns patents in all technical fields, not specifically
software, one cannot apply it to the Linux case. It will be very unlikely, however, that the 283
patents would all be invalidated.
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that most software contain portions of code that potentially infringe patents and
that it is diﬃcult today to write a significant program without using a principle
covered by a software patent. The OSRM study emphasizes that ‘if we were to
study any other operating system, including Windows, we’d come up with at least
as many patents, if not more’ (McLaughlin, 2005). It is just a guess. Empirical
evidence lacks to know how OSS and proprietary software diﬀer in this respect.
Considering that OSS is issued from smaller and less commercial organisations, one
may infer that the OSS probability of patent infringement is higher for OSS than
for proprietary software. OSS organisations have less needs and less money to check
whether code potentially infringes patents. However, it is commonly said that large
commercial companies do not check code for patent infringement.20
An important diﬀerence between proprietary and open source software is that
in the latter potential infringers form a community. Patent owners must therefore
decide which member of the community they will sue. A firm that produces and
commercializes its proprietary software is an obvious target for an infringement
suit. By contrast, open source software is produced by atomistic communities of
users-producers who do not commercialize their production. The problem for an
opportunistic patent owner is thus to determine how to derive a profit from the
infringement of his patent by an OSS. Against this background, hold up essentially
makes sense if the OSS is combined with complementary products, processes or
services that generate profits for the OSS user. This implies that the threat of hold
up does not really concern “pure” OSS users, but rather corporate OSS users. The
catastrophe scenario imagined by Bruce Perens, the creator of the OSI definition,
illustrates this.21 Suppose that the Linux operating system infringes in a substantial
part patents held by some major proprietary software firm. That could result in
liability for all of the many firms using Linux jointly with commercial goods from
cell-phones companies to commercial banks. They would have to pay a fee or to
stop to use Linux, a costly solution too for their costs to switch to another system
are high.
Amongst open source software users, large companies with “deep pockets” re-
main the best targets for patent hold up. The SCO v. IBM case illustrates this,
although it involves copyright and not patents.22 Large companies using OSS can
20Firstly, such a screening is very lengthy and costly. Secondly, it requires reading patents
and in looking at patents companies take the risk to pay for treble damages in case of litigation.
Moreover, large commercial software companies have invested in defensive patents: they can use
their own patents as a bargaining ship in case of dispute (i.e., when both parties have patent
portfolios each could sue the other in a similar way, so neither one does).
21“A coordinated patent attack by a few companies, or even one large company, could com-
pletely destroy Open Source in the United States and cripple it in other nations” The Monster
Arrives: Software Patent Lawsuits Against Open Source Developers, June 30 2006, available at
http://technocrat.net/d/2006/6/30/5032.
22Ironically, up to now, the main case of litigation against Linux, SCO vs IBM, deals with a
copyright and trade secret dispute not with a patent infringement. The initial step of the case
is very close to the story told in the introduction. On March 6, 2003, the SCO group filed a $1
billion lawsuit against IBM claiming IBM has, without authorization, contributed SCO’s IP to
the codebase of the open source, Unix-like Linux operating system . In May 2003, SCO group
sent a letter to members of large US firms warning them of the possibility of liability if they
use Linux. Another series of letters was sent in December 2003 alleging copyright infringement
related to 65 files in the Linux code tree. OSS supporters have characterized SCO’s actions as
an attempt to dissuade developers, distributors and end-users to work with Linux OS in creating
fear, uncertainty and doubt (FUD) in their mind. The lawsuit is still in the discovery phase. It
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still prevent a part of the threats by leveraging their own portfolio against aggres-
sive patent holders. As a matter of fact, a growing number of pure OSS companies23
pragmatically file patents. Red Hat for instance has created its own portfolio of
defensive patents.24 However such individual defensive strategies increase the legal
threat on the whole open source community, by fuelling even more the growth of
patent thickets. The development of small OSS companies can also be jeopardized
by patent litigation. Since small companies do not have “deep pockets”, they are
not really threatened by patent trolls. However, they may still be sued by larger
competitors that wish to push them out of the market. Following the example of
small proprietary software companies, they may be obliged to stay in more secure
technology niches instead of commercializing more generic software to consumers.
Beyond exposing individual companies to litigation threats, software patents
create more generally a climate of legal uncertainty that is detrimental to the OSS
community as a whole. Individual exposures of OSS users to legal risks are not
independent: if an OSS user is held infringing a patent, then all other users and
developers of the same software are de facto infringers. This collective exposure
to patent hold up reinforces the incentives for opportunistic patent owners to at-
tack OSS users, because it generates economies of scale in litigation. (Farrell and
Shapiro, 2006). This is especially the case when OSS are used by a large number of
firms, as with Linux. The legal uncertainty due to patents (but not only to patents),
is sometimes called FUD (which stands for “fear uncertainty and doubt”). It is one
the main obstacles to the diﬀusion of open source software amongst companies. As
we shall see, it also creates incentives for OSS communities in general, and OSS
companies in particular, to organize collective defences against patent threats.
6. OSS defences against patents
In the future, SCO v. IBM might appear as beneficial to OSS. It has initiated
a quick and large learning process on IP law amongst the OSS developers and has
raised their awareness on the importance of legal issues. It has triggered a series of
individual and collective initiatives to reduce the patent threat to the development
and deployment of OSS. Indeed the protection against legal risks is to a large
extent a collective good for communities that are already dedicated to the collective
is therefore far to be solved. However, it seems likely the outcome would diﬀer from the story
sketched out in the introduction of the section. SCO has failed to identify the version or the
line numbers of the Unix code it claimed had been inappropriately transfer in Linux code. The
hypothesis in our story about a substantial part of Linux held by the plaintiﬀ, namely SCO, does
not hold here.
23In reality these companies are not “pure” since they sell services that complement the OSS.
24Red Hat explains its patent policy as follows: ‘Red Hat has consistently taken the position
that software patents generally impede innovation in software development and that software
patents are inconsistent with open source/free software [. . . ] At the same time, we are forced
to live in the world as it is, and that world currently permits software patents. A relatively
small number of very large companies have amassed large numbers of software patents. We
believe such massive software patent portfolios are ripe for misuse because of the questionable
nature of many software patents generally and because of the high cost of patent litigation. One
defense against such misuse is to develop a corresponding portfolio of software patents for defensive
purposes. Many software companies, both open source and proprietary, pursue this strategy. In
the interests of our company and in an attempt to protect and promote the open source community,
Red Hat has elected to adopt this same stance. We do so reluctantly because of the perceived
inconsistency with our stance against software patents; however, prudence dictates this position’.
See http://www.redhat.com/legal/patent_policy.html.
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development of open source code. Legal security can actually be considered as
a particular qualitative element of open source software. The problem for OSS
communities is thus to produce collective security as well as they produce collective
code. It is particularly acute for OSS firms that wish to foster the development
and diﬀusion of OSS, and have therefore an incentive to invest in collective legal
security. A large number of examples show that they manage to do so at two
diﬀerent levels, namely by enhancing good practices to cope with patents within
the communities, and by developing collective strategies to protect the community
against patent threats originating from outside.
6.1. Open source patents. Many of the patents that could threaten open source
software communities are actually owned by members of these communities. It is
usual for large hardware and software firms involved in open source projects to file
patents systematically, even though they intend to share the patented programs
as open source software. They do so to prevent other firms from doing it in their
place and in order to accumulate bargaining chips in case of litigation (Cohen et
al., 2000). A first way to reduce legal uncertainty for OSS communities is therefore
to ensure that community members will not turn their patents against each other
in the future.25
So far various initiatives have been taken to turn patents into open source IPRs
which use is guaranteed for all members of the community. While some of these
initiatives are mere unilateral commitments made by patent owners to encourage
the development of open source projects, others involve more stringent collective
rules that tend to apply to patents the type of open source licensing requirements
that are usually applied to copyright.
A first type of initiative consists for patent holders to pledge unilaterally not
to assert their patents against users of a given open source software. This type
of commitment is similar to alliances between firms that sell proprietary software,
except that they involve a firm and an OSS community. It is illustrated by the
agreement reached in 2006 between Microsoft and Novell, a firm specialized in the
distribution of Linux. Microsoft pledged not to assert its patents against the version
of Linux that is distributed by Novell, thereby facilitating its diﬀusion amongst risk
adverse users. A more general way to freeze his patent rights in order to shelter
users and developers against patent infringement consists in committing not to sue
those who rely on and adhere to a statement of permitted use. This is exactly
what IBM did in announcing in January 2005 that it will release 500 of its software
patents into a patent commons available for the open source community.
Some initiatives aim to coordinate and encourage unilateral commitments. Since
IBM announced it would release 500 of its patents, several companies have made
such patent pledges and covenants. The Open Source Development Lab (hereafter
OSDL), a non profit institution financed by large companies and dedicated to the
promotion of Linux amongst companies now hosts their patents in a “patent com-
mons” that keeps growing.26 It provides a central location where patents pledges
and software patents (issued and pending) are housed. Commitments not to assert
patent rights may concern specific patents (e.g., the 500 IBM US patents) or not.
25In that sense, open source communities face the same problem as standard setting
organizations.
26http://www.patentcommons.org/
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Nokia, another contributor to the OSDL patent commons, has for instance commit-
ted not to assert all its patents against the Linux kernel. More than ten companies
are already listed, including Microsoft that made a patent covenant covering the
standard Oﬃce 2003 XML reference schemas.27 Of course, a software patent owner
cannot benefit himself from the shield oﬀered by these commitments if she sues a
beneficiary of the patent commons for patent infringement. Nokia’s patent pledge,
for instance, states that “non-assertion commitments are subject to the condition
that the party relying on any such commitment and its Aﬃliates do not assert any
of their patents, or patents they control or have a third party assert any patent,
against any Linux Kernel.” The contributors to the patent commons signal they
are ready to counter-attack patent litigation. Patent commons therefore serves two
purposes. Firstly, it gives shelter to OSS developers to innovate in using the code
in the commons. Secondly, it reduces patent litigation in amassing a defensive
patent portfolio that benefits to OSS developers. The patent commons project
even encourages the patenting of ideas and then pledging the patents to expand
the commons.28 Initiatives such as the patent commons are more structural than
unilateral commitments. However, it is important to notice that participation in
such initiatives remains optional for OSS users. Therefore they do not constitute a
perfect protection against opportunistic patent holders.
A more stringent possibility consists in incorporating rules concerning patents
directly in the open source licences. While the other initiatives are taken unilaterally
or multilaterally by firms participating in open source project, licensing clauses
are systematic and compulsory for users of the OSS. Patent defence clauses are
already explicitly included in recent OSS licenses such as MPL, CPL Apple and
Nokia open source licenses. The future issuance of GPLv3 is the major current
initiative of this type. As far as software patents are concerned, the inclusion of an
express patent license and the introduction of a patent defence clause are the main
envisaged changes with respect to the current GPL license.29 These clauses trigger
the termination of the license in case the licensee brings a patent infringement
lawsuit against the licensor. As a result, if the licensee sues the licensor, he will
have to stop to run or modify the licensed program.30
Note that the scope of patent defence clauses varies. They may be strictly limited
to lawsuits concerning the licensed software, or may encompass patent attacks to
27http://www.patentcommons.org/commons/pledgesearch.php?displaypledge=55
28‘The Project also provides a meaningful way for those who oppose software patents to use
the current patent system for the benefit of the open source community and industry. Patenting
ideas reduces the likelihood that detractors of open source software and open standards will
obtain a patent on that same invention and use it against the community and industry, or extract
royalties for its use. More importantly, patenting ideas and then pledging the patents in support
of The Commons expands and reinforces the protective environment of The Commons’. See
http://www.patentcommons.org/about/the_commons.php
29The current GPL version, GPLv2, contains a termination clause but it is very narrow. It
is triggered when the program infringes a patent, not every time the licensor is sued for patent
infringement; furthermore, the termination clause ends the licensee right to distribute not his
rights to run and modify the program. The future version of GPL will undoubtedly be more
eﬀective.
30This retaliation mechanism can only be eﬀective if there is an interest for the licensee to
continue to use the programme. More precisely, the licensee has to balance his expected benefits
from the patent dispute with her termination costs, that is, the switching costs to another software.
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other software of the licensor as well as lawsuits against his customers and users.31
The larger the scope, the more eﬀective the retaliation mechanism. However too
constraining patent clauses may also be rejected by open source users. As for
patent commons, their willingness to accept strong commitment must be taken into
consideration when designing the license. Because of this participation constraint,
there is no guarantee that unilateral or multilateral commitments to freeze patent
threats against OSS can entirely suppress the uncertainty generated by software
patents. This would require indeed that patent owners accept to give up all the
rights their patents confer them, which seems very unlikely.
6.2. Defence initiatives. No statistical evidence on changes in individual be-
haviour of developers before and after SCO is available. However, it seems that
many developers have adopted specific defence strategies against patent risk. Those
strategies aim to produce eﬀective answers to patent litigation, thereby reducing
patent owners’ incentives to initiate litigations. They often have an important col-
lective dimension. Contrary to the commitments discussed supra, they can also be
eﬀective against opportunistic patent owners that do not belong to the community.
A first possible reply to infringement allegation consists in re-engineering the
section of the program in order to circumvent the patent. This is possible for
a single firm. However this circumvention strategy is much more powerful and
credible if it is implemented cooperatively by a community of OSS developers. OSS
developers’ capacity and incentives to support it constitute an eﬀective deterrent
for opportunistic patent owners.
Some large OSS firms also deter litigation and fight FUD by committing to
ensure some protection to users and developers in case of intellectual property
right infringement. HP, for instance, provides indemnification and legal defence to
its customers for claims by SCO. Red Hat has created a legal defence fund for open
source developers. From its part, OSDL has raised several millions of dollars to
be able to defend developers, including Linus Tordvals, subjected to Linux related
litigation by the SCO group. OSDL has also raised US $4 million to seed a legal
center that provides free services (e.g., litigation support, lawyer training) to open
source developers and projects. IBM, Intel, Novell and Sun are contributors to
these funds. Such initiatives reduce the negative impact of FUD resulting from
SCO lawsuits. They signal to future litigators that individual developers and small
OSS organizations can resist to patent litigation for they have a large set of good
friends, including some with powerful financial strength.32
31The current draft version of GPLv3 states in section 2 that the license terminates ‘if you
bring suit against anyone for patent infringement of any of your essential patent claims [. . . ] for
making, using, selling [. . . ] a work based on the program’. As a result, assuming that the GPLv3 is
issued and quickly substitutes with GLPv2 , the risk of patent litigation for OSS will dramatically
decrease because the OSS use the whole economy is huge today and nearly half OSS is licensed
under GPL.
32Note that some firms also specialize in supplying services that enable the development of
patent proof software. For instance, Blackduck Software, a privately held company founded in
2002, proposes software management compliance solutions. Its software platform, ProtexIP, val-
idates software contents and license compliance. Its clients (e.g., Eclipse Foundation) use it to
screen code that comes from third parties. OSRM is another example of companies involved in
the growing business of mitigating legal risks related to OSS. OSRM oﬀers a risk assessment of the
open source components used by firms as well as insurances against claims of patent infringement.
Although such firms may work with OSS users, their business model is very diﬀerent from the
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Another collective litigation deterrence strategy consists in gathering and keeping
prior art information that may be used to invalidate patents. The communities of
developers can use their collaborative methods to more eﬃciently and rapidly dig
around patents. Collecting prior art also benefits from scale economies. Several
centralised projects have been initiated. For example, Grokline33 a community-
based, collaborative research project, was designed to trace the ownership history
and survivable legal enforcement rights of UNIX and UNIX-like software code.
OSDL has also launched a large Prior Art initiative34 in collaboration with the
US Patents and Trademarks Oﬃce. It leverages the collaboration of open source
communities to build up an operational database of software prior art. The database
will provide an eﬀective tool to invalidate patents in case of litigation, but it will
also facilitate the work of patent examiners and help them screen valuable patent
applications.
7. Conclusion
Contrary to the common wisdom that open Source Software is opposed to intel-
lectual property, we have shown that copyright law is at the heart of open source
licensing models, although it is not used for the usual exclusion purpose. We argue
that for this reason precisely, the future development of open source software largely
depends on considerations relating to intellectual property. We firstly shed light on
the problem of license proliferation that may yield incompatibilities between open
source software. We then focus on potential problems raised by software patents.
Our conclusion is rather optimistic. As proprietary software, open source software
is certainly subject to the risk of patent hold up. However, the threat concerns firms
that use OSS much more than individual and non-profit OSS users. Therefore, its
main impact is to hinder the diﬀusion of OSS among firms by generating legal un-
certainty. Moreover, legal security is a collective good for the OSS community as
well as the software itself. Thus members of OSS communities, and foremost firms,
have individual and collective incentives to reduce legal uncertainty. Although the
resulting collective initiatives may not be suﬃcient to eliminate any threat due to
patents, they confer OSS a significant advantage over proprietary software.
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